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INCOME TAX: DEATH OF THE EMPLOYER MANDATE TEST
FOR HOME OFFICE DEDUCTIONS
Stephen A. Bodzin, 60 T.C. 820 (1973)
Taxpayer, an Internal Revenue Service attorney, maintained an office
in his residence for purposes of familiarizing himself with current tax
law developments and completing job assignments during evenings and
weekends. He accordingly deducted that portion of his rent and other residential expenses reasonably allocable to his home office as a section 1621
business expense. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction
on the grounds that maintenance of the home office was not mandated by
taxpayer's employer as a condition of employment. The United States Tax
Court, sitting en banc, refused to follow this "employer mandate" test and
HELD, taxpayer's home office expenses were appropriate and helpful in his
2
occupation and were therefore deductible section 162 business expenses.
Section 162 provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business." 3 "Ordinary" expenses have been defined as those costs that are normal or usual for the group of which the taxpayer is a part.4 "Necessary" expenses are expenses that are "appropriate and
helpful" to his business;5 they need not be "absolutely essential."6 Although

1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162.
2. 60 T.C. 820 (1973) (Drenne, Featherston, Quealy 9- Scott, JJ., dissenting). Interestingly, since Bodzin was working for the Interpretative Division of the Internal Revenue Ser-

vice, the instant case assumes the characteristics of an in-house fight. In order for home
office expenses to be deductible, the Service requires that the employer condition employment on the employee's having an office in his home. Earlier cases permitting deductions
for home office expenses could arguably have been decided on the rationale that the employer mandate test was satisfied by implication. See, e.g., Christopher A. Rafferty, 30 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1971); Herman E. Bischoff, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966). In the
instant case, however, Bodzin's employer had not actually or impliedly required a home
office. Although Bodzin had deadlines to meet, they were self-imposed. The office supplied
by the IRS was of adequate size, was available for use 24 hours a day and 7 days a week,
and was always appropriately heated or cooled. The distance from Bodzin's home to the
IRS office (about 30 minutes) and his membership in a car pool made overtime work at
the main office difficult; it did not make it impossible. Although the employer mandate
test was not met, Bodzin's office in his residence was appropriate and helpful to his overtime work. 60 T.C. at
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §162(a).
4. E.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Welch v. Helvering, 290 US. 111 (1933).
Thus, an expenditure for coating a company's basement, which was used for curing hams
and bacons, to prevent contamination from oil seeping from a nearby refinery, was found
to be an ordinary expense and not a capital expenditure even though the particular taxpayer would probably never again make a similar expenditure. Midland Empire Packing
Co., 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
5. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111
(1933); Blackmer v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1934).
6. Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177, 180-81 (1st Cir. 1953).
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these definitions seem dear, much of the controversy surrounding the deductibility of employee home office expenses has centered around their
necessity.7
Deductions for home office expenses were generally allowed in early cases
without any showing that the employer had required the expenditures." The
employer mandate test was first used to deny deductions for the costs of an
office in a residence in Hai-old H. Davis.9 The value of that decision as precedent is somewhat questionable, however, since the case was remanded on appeal'0 and, since the Tax Division of the Department of Justice admitted an
error in denying the deduction.1 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Raum
noted that although an employer's requirement that an employee must make

7. It is clear that the expense must be incurred primarily in carrying on a trade or
business. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162(a). Thus, if an expenditure is predominately personal
as opposed to business related, it is non-deductible personal expense and the "necessary"
test need not be considered. Recognizing this, the instant court declared: "A finding that
the home office was simply for the taxpayer's personal convenience would bar the deduction if the Court concluded that personal convenience was the primary reason for maintaining the office. Such a finding would displace any conclusion as to 'appropriateness' and
'helpfulness.'" (Emphasis added.) 60 T.C. at
8. See, e.g., Morris S. Schwartz, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 725 (1961); Freda IV. Sandrich,
5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 234 (1946). Historically, deductions by employees have been looked
at with greater suspicion than deductions by employers. Early cases disallowed employees'
deductions that were for the benefit of the employer, unless there was a relation between
the expenditure and the amount of compensation received from the employer. Hal E.
Roach, 20 B.T.A. 919 (1930); Franklin M. Magill, 4 B.T.A. 272 (1926). The rationale was
that one tax entity should not be permitted to take a deduction for paying the expenses
of another tax entity. When the employer mandate test was first established by Judge
Learned Hand in Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1938), it was actually
used to allow a deduction. Moreover, Schmidlapp can be interpreted to mean that if an
expenditure is required by an employer, it is deductible; not that an expenditure must
be required by an employer to be deductible. The court said: "It is no answer to say that
[the expenditures] were for the bank's benefit; so were all the taxpayer's services; if it
[the bank] did in fact give him to understand that he was to extend a factitious hospitality
in its interest, the cost of it was a necessary expense of his office." Id. at 682. Nevertheless,
some courts have treated the employer mandate test as the exclusive standard to be applied.
See, e.g., Manoel Cardoza, 17 T.C. 3 (1951) (professor denied a deduction for overseas
travel not required by his employer). Cf. Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950)
(teacher allowed a deduction for additional education when that was an acceptable manner
of renewing her teaching certificate). Cardoza and Hill were important precedents to the
development of the traditional view of non-deductibility because the primary emphasis in
the first enunciation of the employer mandate test, Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962),
was on education rather than on home office expenses.
9. 38 T.C. 175 (1962). Although deductions for education expenses and a portion of the
home office expenses in Davis were claimed under §162, most of the home office expenses
were claimed as §167 depreciation expenses. The distinction is insignificant, however, since
both the majority and the dissent used their respective tests of deductibility under §162
to decide whether the home office was business property depreciable under §167. 38 T.C. 175,
180, 187 (1962).
10. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the Davis case by
stipulation in an unpublished decision on Jan. 30, 1964.
11. Lewis, Taxes and the Professor's Home Office-Rulings, Cases, and Commentary,
47 CHI. B. RxcoP, 161 (1965).
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certain expenditures as a condition of employment tends to show "necessity,"
such a requirement is not a prerequisite to section 162 deductions;1 2 "necessary" expenses need only be "appropriate and helpful."131
The Commissioner has consistently taken a contrary view. In the year
Davis was decided, Revenue Ruling 62-18014 formalized the Commissioner's
"employer mandate" test for home office deductions. The ruling denied deductions to employees unless maintenance of a home office was mandated by
an employer, even though use of the office was closely related to the nature of
the employment. 5
Judicial reluctance to overrule administrative interpretations96 was
manifested by the Tax Court's initial circumvention of the issue dealt with
in Revenue Ruling 62-180. For example, in Clarence Peiss 7 a professor was
allowed a deduction for research facilities in his home. The case can be interpreted, however, as holding that the employer mandate test had been satisfied by implication, since the taxpayer's rank and salary were partially determined by his productivity as a researcher.18 Inasmuch as the employer did not
provide adequate research or office facilities,'19 the professor was effectively
20
forced to use his home.
The unqualified employer mandate requirement of Revenue Ruling 6218021 was upheld in Valentine J. Anzalone.22 In that case the taxpayer was
provided with an always available office, which was located twenty-five minutes from his home. 23 The court sustained the Commissioner's finding that
the home office expense was not a condition of taxpayer's employment and
was therefore a personal expense expressly nondeductible4 under section
262.25

12. 38 T.C. 175, 186 (1962).

13. Id. See notes 5, 6 supra.
14. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52.
15. Id. "An employee who, as a condition of his employment, is required to provide
his own space and facilities for performance of his duties and regularly uses a portion of
his personal residence for that purpose may deduct a pro rata proportion of the expenses of maintenance and depredation on his residence. However, the voluntary, occasion-

al or incidental use by an employee of a part of his residence in connection with his employment does not entitle him to a business expense deduction." (Emphasis added.)
16. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Fawcus Mach.
Co. v. United States, 282 US. 375, 378 (1931).
17. 40 T.C. 78 (1963), acquiesced in 1968-2 Cum. BuLL. 2.
18. Id. at 80.
19. Id.
20. Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963-2 CuM. BuLL.85, and Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 55
acknowledge that in most cases an implied job requirement to do independent research
would be sufficient to allow a deduction for facilities in the home, even if he had tenure
and could not lose his job. See J. CHOmMIE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 77, 81 (1968).
21. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 52.
22. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 497 (1964).
23. The facts in Anzalone are very similar to those in the instant case.
24. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 498.
25. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, §262.
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Nevertheless, most decisions have allowed the home office deduction under
proper circumstances, despite taxpayers' failure to meet the "employer mandate" test. For example, the "appropriate and helpful" test advocated by
Judge Raum in Davis was applied by him in Herman E. Bischoff°l to determine whether an expenditure was deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. Although Judge Raum stated that such an expense need not
be required by the employer to be deductible," his comment may be regarded as dictum. The lack of appropriate heating or air conditioning after
hours, coupled with the employer's requirement that Bischoff work overtime to meet deadlines implied an employer mandate for a home office.
More recently, the landmark case of Newi v. Commissioner28 further
signaled the decline of the employer mandate test. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a Tax Court memorandum decision2 9 holding that otherwise deductible home office expenses were not to be disallowed for the lack
of an employer mandate. Although the Second Circuit did not expressly
overrule Revenue Ruling 62-180,3o Newi has subsequently been cited as
abolishing the ruling's employer mandate test.31 Nevertheless, Newi has also
been limited to its facts and thus held inapplicable under essentially identical
factual situations. In Paul J. O'Connell32 primary emphasis was placed upon
the lack of an employer mandate and thus the lack of necessity.33 As a result
of these conflicting interpretations of Newi and its effect on the employer
mandate tests, a definitive ruling was needed.
34
The instant case developed as an Internal Revenue Service in-house fight.
Since the Service, as taxpayer's employer, did not request, require, nor expect taxpayer to have a home office there was no express employer mandate.
Furthermore, there could be no implied employer mandate because Bodzin
was never required to work overtime and because his employer provided
an office that was always accessible and comfortable. The primary issue,
therefore, was whether the "appropriate and helpful" test or the "employer

26. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966).
27. Id. at 539.
28. 432 F. 2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
29. George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686 (1969).
30. Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1970).
31. LeRoy AV. Gillis, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 429 (1973) (sales manager for an insurance
company used an extra room in his home for business purposes); Richard K. Johnson, 31
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 941 (1972) (taxpayer used part of his apartment for office space
and storage of tools used in his work); James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074
(1971) (taxpayer used his den to correct papers and to prepare lesson plans and visual aids);
Christopher A. Rafferty, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1971) (taxpayer was a field engineer
who was not provided an office by his employer and who did technical work and kept
technical literature in his home office); Marvin L. Dietrich, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 685
(1971) (unfairness of treating an employee differently from an employer was emphasized).
32. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1972).
33. Id. at 842-43. The court also implied that the taxpayer had failed to meet his
burden of proof, saying it had not been shown "petitioner could not have done his work
at the . . . office as well or better than at his apartment." Id. at 843.
34. See note 2 supra. The amount of the deduction was not at issue in the instant case.
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mandate" test was to be applied in determing deductibility of home office expenses. Finding no reason to deviate from the test normally used to determine
whether an expenditure is "necessary," the Bodzin majority applied the "appropriate and helpful" test.3 5 The instant holding therefore affirmed the
majority of earlier cases,36 which had held that the Revenue Ruling 62-180
employer mandate test need not be met in order to deduct home office expenses.
There were, however, three dissenting opinions in the instant case ex37
pressing belief that the expenditure was a non-deductible personal expense.
Additionally, the contentions of two of the dissenting opinions were supported
by analogies to the recent United States Supreme Court case of Fausner v.
Commissioner,38 in which a taxpayer attempted to deduct a portion of his
commuting expenses because he was forced to transport his tools to and from
work. The Court held that the cost of transporting tools could be deducted
only when such expenses were in addition to normal commuting expenses.3 9
The attempt to analogize Fausner to the instant case ignores the fact that
a specific portion of Bodzin's home had been set aside to be used primarily
for business purposes, thus falling outside the scope of section 262 nondeductible personal expenses.40 The argument can therefore be made that the
home office "uses up" part of the taxpayer's home, while the transportation
of a commuter's tools neither "uses up" any of the commuter's assets nor
causes him additional expense.
Furthermore, since Fausner allows deductions only for expenditures that
are in addition to normal expenditures, 41 application of the Fausner test to
home office expenses would go beyond the employer mandate test. Using the
Fausner test, no home office deduction would be allowed an employee who
is required by his employer to have a home office if its creation did not require additional space in the taxpayer's home. Only if a larger apartment
were rented or a larger house built to accommodate the office would the
Fausner test allow the taxpayer a deduction.
Since the majority in the instant case did not feel that Fausner was applicable, the requirement that a home office be necessary 42 is satisfied if it is
appropriate and helpful to the business of the taxpayer. 43 Nevertheless, the

35. 60 T.C. at
(1973).
36. See note 31 supra.
37. 60 T.C. at
(1973) (Drennen, Featherston, Quealy &Scott, JJ., dissenting).
38. 413 U.S. 838 (1973) (per curiam).
39. Id. at
40. See Treas. Reg. §I262-1(b)-3 (1958).
41. Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973).
42. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
43. 60 T.C. at
(1973). The Government has appealed Bodzin to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. CCH 1974 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 70,652.
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taxpayer always bears the burden of proof.44 He must not only show that the
home office expenditure is ordinary and necessary, but also that a particular
part of his home is used for the office, 45 that it is used regularly, 46 that it is
not primarily for his own convenience 4 7 and that the amount of the deduction is reasonable. The percentage of floor space used as an office and the percentage of time that space is used for business must both be considered in
48
determining what is a reasonable deduction.
The present decision is a logical and welcome clarification of the law
for the taxpayer with a home office. The "employer mandate" test was an
unreasonable standard, not imposed on other section 162 deductions. In contrast, the "appropriate and helpful" test is a fair basis for determining the
deductibility of any expense incurred in a "trade or business." A legitimate
deduction is now available for many white-collar taxpayers who previously
have been wrongly excluded by the Commissioner's "employer mandate"
test.
RICHARD D. GREEN

44. E.g., Larry N. Kutchinski, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 216 (1968) (deduction was denied
when taxpayer failed to show the amount of time he had used the home office); Neil M.
Kelly, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 472 (1964) (deduction denied when taxpayer failed to show
that it was necessary for him to have a home office and that a specific portion of his
home was used as an office).
45. Neil M. Kelly, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 472 (1964).
46. Larry N. Kutchinski, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 216 (1968).
(1973).
47. 60 T.C. at
48. Rev. Rul. 62-180 set up the "percentage floor space-percentage time" formula. As
originally devised, the deduction was determined by multiplying the expenditure (rent, for
example) by the percentage of the apartment used as an office and then by the percentage
of time the office is used for business purposes. The percentage of time was determined
on a 24-hour-per day basis: if the office were used 2 hours per day as an office, then it
was considered to have been used 2/24ths of the time. Martha E. Henderson, 27 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 109 (1968). A taxpayer has successfully contended, however, that the percentage
of time should be computed on the basis of the total time the room is actually used: if a
'room is used 8 hours per day, 2 hours of which it is used as an office, the office has been
used 2/8ths of the time as an office. G. W. Gino, 60 T.C. 304 (1973). Gino, however, is on
appeal by the Government to the Ninth Circuit. 9 CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAX Rxs'. 70,655.
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